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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
unless a person can come within the Kintner rule,92 the new act does afford
certain tax advantages so as to justify its use by those individuals who would
otherwise be unable to establish a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan.
ATTORNEY'S WORK PRODUCT RULE-AN AREA OF CONFUSION
I. THE FEDERAL RULES CONCERNING PRETRIAL DIscovERY
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evidence an attitude1 more liberal than
the restrictive common-law rule towards pretrial discovery.2 The scope of the
deposition-discovery mechanism is determined by rule 26(b).3 Although this
rule specifically refers merely to depositions, 4 it is basic to the entire deposition-
discovery mechanism 5 in that it is incorporated by reference into all of the other
federal procedural rules.
Rule 26(b) provides for discovery of information, books, papers, documents
and other tangibles. The term, "work product"0 of a lawyer, would normally
connote these discoverable items. However, they are discoverable only if they
are relevant and not privileged. 7 The limitations set out in Federal Civil
Rule 30(b) and (d), 8 which qualify rule 26(b), do not clarify the effect of
the latter on the "work product" privilege, since they merely indicate that a
court can exercise discretion, upon a showing of good cause, in limiting the
extent, time and place of discovery and the taking of depositions.
This situation has produced confusion. The normal tangible manifestations
of trial preparation were seemingly included within the permissible scope of
discovery, yet the material was not susceptible to discovery if "privileged."
92. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
1. "The basic philosophy of the present federal procedure is that prior to trial every
party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all relevant information in the
possession of any person, unless the information is privileged." 2A Barron & Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure With Forms § 641, at 13 (Rules ed. 1961).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
3. "Rule 26. Depositions Pending Action ....
(b) Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by
Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts ... " Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
4. Ibid.
5. 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure With Forms § 641 (Rules
ed. 1961).
6. The term "work product" has been defined as "the results of the lawyer's use of
his tongue, his pen, and his head, for his client." Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223
(3d Cir. 1945).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b), (d).
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The precise meaning of "privileged," as used in the rules, was not made dear.
Rule 34,9 dealing more particularly with the production and copying of
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any
of the matters . 10
within the scope of permissible discovery"1 offered no clarification. Production
was based upon a showing of good cause, and the order requiring it was e.x-
pressly limited to a party and to things in his or her custody.'
The present construction of these rules that, absent a showing of good cause,
the work product of an attorney should be privileged from disclosure to adverse
parties,'13 has strong roots in the common law. However, no distinction was
drawn between materials personally prepared by the attorney; those provided
for him by his client'- and, materials compiled by others at his suggestion.10
Nor would there seem to be any reason for observing such a distinction. 1
This privilege was not predicated on mere membership in the bar, but rather
for it to accrue, the lawyer must have been acting in his capacity as an attorney,
i.e., giving legal advice on a particular matter.17 In addition, it would appear
that the attorney had to be engaged in preparation for litigation.18
Application of the privilege was not restricted to statements and other trial
materials personally compiled by counsel but extended to materials gathered
by agents of the client for litigation purposes,' 9 and even to statements taken
by agents of a corporation in the regular course of business.23 Thus, at common
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
10. Ibid.
11. As set out in rule 26(b), see note 3 supra.
12. See note 9 supra.
13. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
14. The latter involves the attorney-client privilege.
15. Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co. v. Quick, [1873] 3 Q.B. 315.
16. See Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the Dktrict
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Amendment].
17. Avery v. Lee, 117 App. Div. 244, 102 N.Y. Supp. 12 (Ist Dep't 1907) (attorney
acting as broker-no privilege).
18. See Crosby v. Berger, 11 Paige (N.Y.) 377 (Ct of Ch. 1S44) (information obtained
from a third party by an attorney acting in a general capacity as coun-ellor-not
privileged). Compare, Peck v. Wflliams, 13 Abb. Pr. 6S (N.Y. Super. CL I61) which
held, on similar facts, that there was no privilege because there "must be at least a con-
troversy anticipated between the parties in relatioa to the subject of which the communi-
cations were made to counsel .... " for a privilege to apply. Id. at 71.
19. Wise v. 'Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 173 At. 640 (1935). "There seems
to be no doubt that reports or statements submitted by an agent to his principal for the
purpose of being laid before an attorney for guidance in . . . impending litigation are
privileged." Id. at 461, 178 At. at 642.
20. Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906). Reports made in anticipation
of a possible litigation and in possession of counsel for use in the suit are privilqged, and
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law the attorney's "work product" privilege was given broad sweep and, as a
necessary consequence, pretrial discovery was severely restricted.
The policy underlying the restrictions on discovery, which seems harsh
in light of present day federal practice, was an implicit faith in the efficacy
of the adversary system as a means of ascertaining truth and the belief that
the "fishing expedition" was not to be tolerated. Thus, each litigant was to
prepare his case independently, and without scrutiny of his opponent's prepa-
rations. Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 ' were, at best, unclear
regarding their intended effect on the "work product" privilege, the courts
were faced with the task of striking a balance between the common-law policy
calling for protection of the attorney and his work and, the newer policy, calling
for extensive pretrial discovery. This has been said to be the most vexatious
problem to have arisen under the federal rules.22
II. DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES AS ORIGINALLY INTERPRETED
Indicative of the conflict between the restrictive discovery policies of the
adversary system and the liberal policies of the federal rules was Bough v.
Lee 2 3 There, the court ordered production of statements and photographs
relating to a contested accident. These materials had been acquired by the
defendant's insurer and turned over to its attorney for use in defending the
action. Although the court ordered production, it recognized the existence of
a "work product" privilege in basing its decision on the fact that the materials
were prepared by the insurance company and "[were] not obtained by the
attorney in preparation for, nor in anticipation of, this action." 24 A similar
result was reached in Price v. Levitt,25 where the materials in question had
been procured by the insurer before retention of counsel and, therefore, were
not the fruits of an investigation by an attorney or one acting in his behalf.20
Likewise in Kulich v. Murray,27 insurer's reports were not granted a privilege
there is no reason to modify that rule because defendant is a corporation and obtained
the memoranda and reports through the usual agencies of a corporation. Id. at 15, 77
N.E. at 279. The matter in issue was the standard report made by conductors In the
event of accident.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37. These are the rules relating to pretrial discovery.
22. 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure With Forms § 652 (Rules
ed. 1961). "Probably the most troublesome question relating to the scope of discovery
is the extent to which a party may inspect documents developed in the course of his
opponents' preparation of the case, that is, the writings, statements of witnesses, etc.,
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorneys, agents or insurers, in anticipation
of litigation or in preparation for trial." Id. at 118.
23. 29 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
24. Id. at 501.
25. 29 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
26. The common-law rule drew no such distinctions. See, e.g., Southwark & Vauxhall
Water Co. v. Quick, [18781 3 Q.B. 315.
27. 28 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See also Seligson v. Camp Westover Inc., I
F.R.D. 733 (S.D.N.Y 1941) holding that the location of the material in the files of an
insurance company or its attorney does not make it privileged.
[Vol. 31
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because their production would not constitute an invasion of an attorney's files,
but only those of an insurance company. While these decisions expand the scope
of discovery allowed at common law, they are all careful to point out, at least
impliedly, that the materials which comprise an attorney's trial preparation
are to be privileged. It would appear that the reasoning of these cases has been
influenced on the one hand by the dictates and policies of the new procedural
rules, and on the other, by a reluctance to open the gates to unlimited dis-
covery. This is the only feasible explanation for the refusal to grant protection
from disclosure merely because an insurance company was involved. In
practice, preparing the defense of negligence actions is carried on almost
exclusively by the defendant's insurer. 'Moreover, most liability policies make
such a procedure mandatory. Where lies the distinction between the disclosure
of preparation in these cases and cases where the attorney for the defendant
personally prepares the defense? In both instances the party defending has
prepared his defense.
Another line of cases declined to apply the privilege to situations where the
statements had been taken in the normal course of business even though
they were obtained with a view towards litigation, and were, in fact, so used.
These cases, too, attempted to maintain, to some extent, the policy of according
protection to trial preparations. Mzrphy v. Ne-,, York & Porto Rico SS. Co.223
held that statements of witnesses procured in the regular course of business
were discoverable. That court, however, qualified its decision by saying that
it is not to be supposed that the Court would direct the disclosure to the plaintiff's
attorney of information gathered by the defendant's attorney after the ... accident
in preparation for the defense of the action. -
Colpak v. Hetterick" followed this result regarding statements made in the
course of business, but based its holding on the ground that the discovery rules
were to be used to uncover only evidence on any matter involved in the action.
Kane v. News Syndicate Co.3 granted discovery of similar statements which
had become part of the attorney's file on the case. This represents the extreme
to which the common law "work product" privilege had been restricted.
It is not to be supposed, however, that the cases which granted a privilege
were any more certain of their basis than those compelling disclosure. In
Poppino v. Jones Store Co.,32 the court found reports, witnesses' statements, and
photographs, gathered by insurance investigators and placed in the custody of
the insurance company's counsel, to be privileged on the ground that those
items were immaterial as evidence and, therefore, not subject to discovery. The
rationale supporting this determination was that the federal rules were intended
2S. 27 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
29. Id. at SSO.
30. 40 F. Supp. 350 (E.D N.Y. 1941). Accord, Corbett v. Columbia Transp. Co,
5 F.R.D. 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1946).
31. 1 F.R.D. 73S (S.).-N.Y. 1941).
32. 1 F.RJ). 215 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
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to be used only to obtain evidence, and not to ascertain an opponent's position."'
Nevertheless, the court discussed, in great detail, its deep concern for the
attorney's freedom from discovery in his trial preparations, 4 and this seems
to have been a very real consideration in the determination of the matter.
One test for determining discoverability, therefore, was the materiality of
the items sought to be discovered. This rule was expressly set down in Condry
v. Buckeye S.S. Co.,35 where production of written memoranda, prepared in
anticipation of litigation was denied since the memoranda were not evidence as
such, but were only intended for use at the trial if the witnesses concerned
were called to testify.
Still other cases took the position that the results of preparation for litigation
were sacrosanct. McCarthy v. Palmer"0 held that although the new rules were
intended to facilitate liberal pretrial examination and discovery, to allow them
to be used to appropriate the opponent's preparation of his case "would
penalize the diligent and place a premium on laziness. It is fair to assume that,
except in the most unusual circumstances, no such result was intended."3 7
Following this rationale, Courteau v. Interlake S.S. Co.88 held that statements
of witnesses made to an attorney were simply not subject to discovery. Like-
wise, in Piorkowski v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,39 the court refused to allow
one party to profit by the other's investigation where statements of witnesses
were concerned. Interrogatories calling for an opinion were also held privileged
on the authority of the McCarthy case.40
This theory found its fullest expression in Stark v. American Dredging Co.,41
which might be described as the precursor to the Supreme Court's apparent
solution 42 of the problem in Hickman v. Taylor.43 The Stark court was called
upon to decide the susceptibility to discovery of signed statements of the
defendant's employees made to its insurance carrier. The court decided that:
The statements were obtained in anticipation of a suit being brought .. .and must
be considered as part of the defendant's preparation of its case. No line of demarca-
tion in this respect can logically be drawn between statements obtained before a suit
is actually begun and those obtained thereafter.44
33. This theory is no longer valid. Rule 26(b) has been amended to the effect that
the materiality and relevancy of the material sought is no longer determinative of the
propriety of its discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
34. 1 F.R.D. at 219.
35. 4 F.R.D. 310 (W.D. Pa. 1945).
36. 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
37. Id. at 586.
38. 1 F.R.D. 525 (W.D. Mich. 1942).
39. 1 F.R.D. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1940).
40. Byers Theatres Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D. Va. 1940).
41. 3 F.R.D. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
42. The problems presented, the final results, and the supporting rationale are quito
similar in each of the cases.
43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
44. 3 F.R.D. at 301.
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In discussing those decisions where production was allowed, the court charac-
terized them as cases where "special considerations seem to have controled " 15
Then, having established a rule, the court qualified it:
The rule should not and has not been made an absolute one so as to work injustice
or unnecessarily impede the production of material evidence.... A request to pro-
duce statements of witnesses taken by the other party in preparation for trial "should
be predicated upon good cause shown."4 6
Between these two positions are cases typified by Matthies v. Peter F.
Connolly Co.,47 which held that
reports, statements and affidavits taken by the company before the matter is sub-
mitted to its attorney can properly be examined but statements and affidavits taken
by the attorney for the Insurance Company, in preparation for trial, are privileged.3
Perhaps the most apt characterization of the entirety of judicial opinion on
the point would be that there was a vacuum that could be filled49 only by
the definitive pronouncement of a higher court or by amendment of the rules
specifically covering the point.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Proposed Amendment of the Rules
In June of 1946, after a four year study of the problems precipated by the
federal rules, the Advisory Committee on the Rules for Civil Procedure pro-
posed to the Supreme Court a slate of amendmentsrO Included in the proposed
revision was the following addition to rule 30(b) specifically covering dis-
covery of matters obtained in preparation for litigation.r1
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing obtained or
prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in antici-
pation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of pro-
duction or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the production or
inspection in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 302.
47. 2 F.R.D. 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
43. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
49. There has been no definitive appellate decision on the point due to the lack of
effective means of appellate review of discovery orders. One can decline to comply with a
discovery order and take an appeal from a contempt citation if one is handed down.
Alternatively, he may appeal the dismissal of the action, if it is dismissed for failure to
comply, but this is a very hazardous course of action. The court may, however, isue
some nonappealable order, such as a stay of further proceedings until the production
order is complied with. (The prospective appellant is seemingly at the mercy of the
district court.) Denial of discovery is only appealable after a judgment on the merits,
at which point the damage is already done. 4 Moore, Federal Practice f 26.37[7] (2d
ed. 1962).
50. Proposed Amendment, 5 F.R.D. 433 (1946).
51. Id. at 456.
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injustice. The court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of
the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35,[52 the conclusions of an expert ,03
Unlike a judicial determination of the point, this rule was not set in, nor
colored by, any particular set of circumstances and the considerations of sub-
stantial justice surrounding them. This form of clarification could and would
have answered the question with regard to all situations since it would not
have been subject to distinctions based on factual situations.
The amendments were submitted to the Supreme Court after it had granted
certiorari in what was to become the landmark case on the point-Hickman
v. Taylor.54 Obviously preferring to deal with the matter by decision, the
Court did not adopt the proposed amendment.
B. Hickman v. Taylor
This case arose out of a death action brought under the Jones Act.05 A tug
boat sank and four of her crew died in the accident. As was customary, the
Steamboat Inspectors conducted a hearing during which the statements of the
surviving crewmen were taken. The attorney for the tug company, anticipating
a possible lawsuit, then took statements of the survivors immediately after the
hearing. Eight months later, the plaintiff brought an action in which thirty-nine
interrogatories were filed. Defendant refused to answer the request to:
"State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs 'J.M.
Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the
towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug 'John M. Taylor.' Attach hereto
exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail
the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports."' 0
The defendants claimed that this interrogatory called for "'privileged matter
obtained in preparation for litigation.' ,,57 They also declined to answer supple-
mental interrogatories, calling for memoranda and further specifics concerning
the statements, on the same ground.
The district court distinguished the Stark case s (which it had decided three
years earlier) on the ground that no hard and fast rule had been laid down
there, and ordered production. 9 The defendants declined, and took an appeal
from the district court's determination that they were in contempt of court. 0
52. Rule 35 provides for physical and mental examinations and that reports of the
results thereof be made available to both parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.
53. Proposed Amendment, 5 F.R.D. at 456-57. (Emphasis omitted.)
54. 328 U.S. 876 (1946). Certiorari had been previously denied. 327 U.S. 808 (1946).
55. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
56. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
57. Ibid.
58. See note 41 supra.
59. 4 F.R.D. at 481-82.
60. "(1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to
answer any question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the
[Vol. 31
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The court of appeals reversed0 ' and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court.02
The Supreme Court6 3 considered the basic question to be whether any of the
devices in the deposition-discovery mechanism 4 might be used to inquire into
materials collected by an adverse party's lawyer in preparing for anticipated
litigation. To solve this, there necessarily had to be a determination of whether
the attorney-client privilege is dispositive of the "work product" difficulty; and,
if not, whether that privilege is the sole exemption to discovery under the
"privilege" exemption in the federal rules.
The court summarily held the attorney-client privilege to be inapplicable
to the facts of the case. Therefore, if protection from discovery were to be
accorded to the attorney's "work product," the "privilege" exception had to
encompass more than the traditional attorney-client exemption.
In its decision, the Court adopted the spirit, if not the letter, of the proposed
amendment."0 The Supreme Court felt that in this case a full and complete
disclosure by defendant's counsel would necessarily include all the pertinent
information garnered, as well as the evaluations and conclusions drawn there-
from. The Court did not approve of such an attempt to secure the opposition's
files without a showing of sufficient reason. Since the petitioner was free to
examine the testimony of the witnesses taken at the public hearings conducted
by the Steamboat Inspectors, there could be no good reason for requiring the
defendant to produce the statements of these same witnesses.
Due to these circumstances, the Court indicated a balance that should pre-
vail between the conflicting policies of legal freedom and full pretrial disclosure:
In our opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with discovery con-
templates production under such circumstances. That is not because the subject
matter is privileged or irrelevant, as those concepts are used in these rules. Here is
simply an attempt, vithout purported necessity or justification, to secure written
statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by
an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As such, it falls outside
the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly
prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of discovcry
deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered a contempt of that court.' Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(b) (1). (Emphasis omitted.)
61. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945).
62. After once denying certiorari, the Supreme Court finally agreed to hear the matter.
See note 54 supra.
63. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
65. 329 U.S. at 507. The attorney-client privilege does not apply to: a) informati'bn
secured from witnesses by an attorney acting on behalf of his client in anticipation of
litigation; b) memoranda, briefs, communications, etc., prepared by counsel for his own
use in prosecuting his client's cause; or, c) writings reflecting his mental imprezzions,
opinions, or legal theories. Id. at 503.
66. Clark, Experience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
S F.R.D. 497, 502 (1949).
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theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions
of an attorney . .. In performing his various duties .. . it is essential that a
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel. 67
The opinion clarifies the underlying equities, and the scope of the privilege.
The adversary system, it was felt, required counsel to marshal and sift the
facts involved, determine their relevancy, and prepare strategy accordingly.
Since this effort is naturally reflected in statements, memoranda, and the like,
they must be protected from discovery. To deny these tangible items protection
would only force them to be collected unwritten. The Court saw this result
as a disastrous one, productive of sharp practice, inefficiency, and a general
demoralization of the legal profession.68
The import of this decision is not, however, a bestowal of absolute privilege
upon trial preparations. Throughout its opinion, the Court was careful to
indicate that the immunity conferred was, at best, a quasi-privilege conditioned
on the absence of a showing of good cause by the movant.60 In its considera-
tion of this requirement, the majority indicated that where a witness was
unavailable, or could be reached only with great difficulty, discovery would
be proper. The burden of proving the need for discovery was placed upon the
party seeking production and was considered to be implicit in the federal rules.
70
IV. PROBLEMS REMAINING AFTER Hickman v. Taylor
Hickman clarified the position of the federal rules with respect to the
privilege safeguarding trial preparation. However, the proper application of the
rule was left to future decisions.
A. Materials Prepared by Third Parties
The first case under the Hickman rule dealt with the problem of statements,
reports and photographs compiled by claims agents"' for the use of counsel
in defense of an action. The rule was held to be applicable only to attorneys.72
67. 329 U.S. at 509-11. (Emphasis added.)
68. Id. at 511.
69. The impact of the Hickman rule has been expressed as follows: "(1) Information
as to facts of the case and statements of witnesses obtained by the adverse party's
attorney are not within the common-law attorney-client privilege; (2) Even the broader
policy against invasion of the attorney's privacy and freedom in the preparation of the
case does not make them absolutely immune, but (3) The party asking for disclosure Is
bound to show that the situation is a rare one having exceptional features which make
the disclosure necessary in the interests of justice; and (4) Where the party seeking dis-
covery has obtained or is able to obtain the information asked for elsewhere, he has not
met the burden." 4 Moore, Federal Practice, ff 26.23[8.-1], at 1381-82 (2d ed. 1962).
70. 329 U.S. at 512.
71. The fact that the person preparing the material in these cases was a claims agent
does not seem to be the significant factor; rather the fact that the materials were prepared
by third persons appears to be determinative.
72. De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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Another early case indicated that this was to be the rule of application since
the claims agent or investigator was not within the narrow question presented
in Hickman.7 3 The basis of this position seems to lie not only in the difference
in the questions, but also in the inherent dissimilarity of the functions of
the claims agent and the attorney.74 Exclusion of this sort of material from the
"work product" immunity is still observed by many courts,70 and has been
considered a settled principle.70
The additional factor of supervision by an attorney would not transform
the fruits of such an investigation into "work product."77 This position has even
resulted in discovery of the results of, and methods used in, a public survey
conducted under the supervision of attorneys preparing to prosecute a claim
of trademark infringement.7" Under this strict view, the fact that the claims
agent happens to be an attorney does not immunize the results of his worh, even
though his efforts were in preparation for trial.7 9 Seemingly, this reasoning is
based on the theory that the hat worn by a particular individual at the crucial
time is the determining factor. If some of the lawyer's services, therefore, were
those of a claims agent, there would be no exemption.80 Pursued to its logical
conclusion, this results in a judicial reluctance to apply the privilege to state-
ments taken by attorneys, since the usually discoverable work of investigators
would then be performed by lawyers in an attempt to avoid discovery.8 '
It is difficult to extract a general rule from these decisions since they are
not extensively reasoned .1 2 Possibly the rationale of the cases applying the
"exercise of legal skill" test8 3 to determine immunity under "work product"
justifies the rule regarding information obtained through the offices of third
parties. However, these cases are generally concerned with the nature of the
material rather than its origin.
The position holding claims agents and other third parties who supply
73. Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.RD. 610 (E.DN.Y. 1947).
74. Hughes v. Pennsylvania R!R., 7 F.R.D. 737 (E.D!N.Y. 194S). "What an attorney
does to prepare his client's cause for trial, and what a Claim Agent does for his employer
prior to institution of a lawsuit, and which may never be embodied in a lawye's file, are
thought to be diverse products." Ibid.
75. E.g., Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 24 F.R.D. 493 (M.D.N.C. 19t0).
76. Szymanski v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 14 F.RD. 82 (S.D..N.Y. 1952).
77. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Durkin
v. Pet Milk Co, 14 F.R.D. 3S5 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
78. Seven-Up Co. v. Get Up Corp., 30 F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
79. Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.). 732 (D.D.C. 1943).
So. Reiss v. British Gen. Ins. Co., 9 F.R.D. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
81. Caruso v. Mloore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 675 (E.DMN.Y. 1961).
S2. 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure With Forms § 652.2 (Rules
ed. 1961).
83. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Bifferato v.




information to be used in litigation beyond the protection of the Hickman
privilege is by no means universal. The contrary view arose almost simul-
taneously. In Hanke v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co.,8 4 a court held that
information, witnesses' statements, and memoranda were not discoverable from
the general claims agent of the defendant. Under this rationale, it has been
held, a fortiori, that preparation by third parties under the direction of counsel
would be privileged.85
The best reasoned apologia for this latter position (and treatment of the
problem in general) is to be found in Alltmont v. United States.8 0 This case
is quite similar on its facts to Hickman. In Alltmont, however, the statements
were taken by members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, rather than
by counsel personally. Based on this distinction, the district court denied
defendant's claim to a "work product" exemption, and held that the privilege
applied only where the attorney was acting in the capacity of a professional
advisor. Therefore, the fact that some of the agents were lawyers did not
immunize their work.8 7
Although the language of the Supreme Court in Hickman was necessarily
directed to statements personally obtained by counsel (since that was the
situation at hand) the Third Circuit Court of Appeals felt that its rationale
had a wider implication and was applicable to all statements of prospective
witnesses obtained for use by trial counsel, regardless of who had obtained them.
In support of this position, the court in Alltmont pointed out that since the
basis of the immunity was not the attorney-client privilege, and since it
arose only if good cause for production could not be shown, no valid dis-
tinction existed between materials prepared by counsel and those prepared for
his use at trial. In each case, the information ultimately found its way into the
lawyer's files on the matter. The adverse party could not possibly have a greater
or different need for it based on the character of its origin and, therefore, his
right to discovery should not rest on that distinction.8"
This seemingly well-reasoned approach to the problem in the light of Hick-
man has met with acceptance in some areas.89 The criterion under this view
is that
statements obtained for the purpose of litigation . . . are normally inadmissible as
work product . . . if obtained by counsel, or even if obtained, not by counsel, but
for counsel's use .... 0
This rule, however, is subject to the same inadequacies as that of Hlickman,
84. 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
85. Berger v. Central Vt. Ry., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass. 1948).
86. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
87. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948), rev'd sub nom. Alltmont
v. United States, supra note 86.
88. 177 F.2d at 976.
89. See Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) (information provided
by a third party).
90. Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112, 114 (D.N.J. 1956).
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i.e., its dependence on the facts in question leaves room for contrary inter-
pretation.
While some courts have accepted the Alltmont rule at its face value,,"
others have declined to do so. United States v. Kdlscy-Hayes Whcd Co..12
held that information gathered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, acting under the supervision of government lawyers, was protected by the
"work product" theory because the agents, for all practical purposes, were in
the position of junior members of a large law firm. In dicta, the court indicated
that claims agents and investigators neither occupy this position, nor receive
the privilege.93 It would seem that a reading of the Hickman rule in the light
of the Alltmont interpretation would have resolved the difficulty with respect
to trial materials prepared by third persons. It has not. The case and its
position are considered to be expressions of a minority rule.P' The point is,
therefore, still open to argument although most courts favor production of
such materials.0
B. Anticipation of Litigation
The Hickman decision accorded protection to witnesses' statements tahen
in "anticipation of litigation." This qualification must be complied with in order
for any given material to be considered as "work product." From a considera-
tion of the facts in Hickman, it is apparent that the term was not intended to
apply solely to materials gathered after the commencement of an actionYO
This circumstance has left open to conjecture the exact scope of the term
in "anticipation of litigation," and its effect on the adninistration of the rule.
Here too, there is some disagreement.
Of course, if the material has been acquired before the accrual of the cause
of action, it is not considered privileged.0 7 In Park & Tillord Distillers Corp. v.
United States,9s materials prepared by a government agency for general purposes
of litigation were not considered "work product." These materials had not been
assembled for use in any litigation that might arise out of a particular incident
as were those in the Hickman case, but rather for use in "litigation wherein
the OPA might be a party. ' 9 This point of distinction was felt sufficient to
warrant a denial of protection. Based on ratiocination of this sort, materials
which had been prepared for use in a prior controversy have also been con-
91. See 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure With Forms § 652.2
(Rules ed. 1961).
92. 15 F.R.D. 461 (ED. Mich. 1954).
93. Id. at 462-63.
94. Cf. 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure With Forms § 652
(Rules ed. 1961).
95. Ibid.
96. The statements in Hickman had been taken eight months previous to the com-
mencement of the action. 329 U.S. 495, 493 (1947).
97. McManus v. Harkness, 11 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
98. 20 F.R.). 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
99. Id. at 406.
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sidered to be outside the "anticipation of litigation" requirement. 100 The
rule as drawn from these holdings is that the materials must have been pre-
pared with an eye towards the particular litigation at hand. Hickman, however,
granted immunity to materials prepared for use in any controversy which
might have arisen out of the one accident. One wonders exactly what the
Supreme Court's decision might have been had more than one action arisen
out of the situation in that case (five people died in the accident, yet only one
estate chose to sue). Would the statements have been privileged in the first
action and discoverable in any subsequent suit that might have been brought?
While the Hickman Court, in setting forth the rule, determined that the
preparations were made in anticipation of litigation even though the statements
had been taken before the bringing of the action, many district courts have not
always been as generous. In Duska v. Pennsylvania R.R., 1°1 it was held that
all materials prepared prior to the filing of a claim were discoverable; but there
could be no free discovery of those acquired after that point, since only the
latter would have been directly prepared for trial purposes.
There is also a line of cases holding that statements taken in the normal
course of business pursuant to company policy were outside the scope of the
"work product" rule because they were not prepared in "anticipation of
litigation."'01 2 But in Hickman too, the statements were taken as a matter
of company policy. The prospective defendants in Hickman instructed the
attorney to take whatever action he deemed necessary for the defense of any
litigation that might arise.10 3 The statements in issue were those of the de-
fendant's employees, which in effect were no more than reports. Under
an Alltmont' ° 4 interpretation of the Hickman rule, the fact of an attorney's
involvement in taking statements would not be determinative.
On the reverse side of the coin, a few district courts have held that where
taking witnesses' statements by train crews was the policy of the defendant's
general counsel, it was not violative of the "anticipation of litigation" require-
ment.105
V. Loss OF THE PRMLEGE
A. Good Cause
The "work product" rule is not an absolute privilege. Both the Hickman
decision and the proposed amendment qualified the protection accorded trial
100. Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del. 1954).
101. 10 F.R.D. 150 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
102. See, e.g., Morrone v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 F.R.D. 214 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (accident
reports).
103. 4 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
104. The fact that the materials were prepared by third parties for the use of an
attorney does not, by itself, take it out of the "work product" exemption. 177 F.2d 971
(3d Cir. 1949).
105. Berger v. Central Vt. Ry., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass. 1948). Where production was
sought of materials prepared by both the defendant's attorneys and those of a third party
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preparations upon an absence of a showing by the movant of valid and weighty
reasons for production. 00 While the Supreme Court indicated what might
constitute such a showing, 0 7 the tests and standards to be applied in determin-
hag whether the burden has been met have been, for the most part, left to the
courts.'0 s It is generally conceded that the requirement in a "work product"
situation is more stringent than the normal "good cause" requirement for the
production of documents.' 0° What amounts to "good cause" depends, of course,
on the facts of the particular case." 0 The showing required in the face of a
privilege should involve "rare situations having exceptional features which make
the disclosures necessary in the interest of justice and where the party seeking
discovery is not otherwise able effectively to secure the information."' Thus,
discovery of an expert's notes, but not of his conclusions, was allowed where
the machinery in question had been disassembled and was no longer available
for inspection." 2' Most often, the need for discovery over privilege can be
stated in two alternative requirements: (1) a need for the documents in
original form; (2) a lack cf independent means of discovery.11 3
Obviously, if the movant is ignorant of the identity of the witnesses or
others who have supplied the desired information, or if they are unavailable
to him, the privilege will not prevent discovery." 4 Conversely, if the identity of
the witness is known to the moving party, and is available to him, there is no
good reason for a denial of the privilege." 5 This has been held to be the rule
even where the identity of the informant was known to the movant, but the
witness lived a distance away;" 0 and where the witness was still alive, but an
employee of an adverse party." 7
Statements taken at the time of the incident out of which the action arose,
or photographs of the scene, have been held discoverable even though they
who was not a party to the action, the "work product" immunity was applied even though
some of the documents had been prepared by the attorneys of one not a party to the
action. Lichter v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 24 F.R.D. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
106. 329 U.S. at 511; see also note 50 supra and accompanying test.
107. 329 U.S. at 511.
10S. 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 652.4 (Rules ed. 1951).
109. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
110. Tobin v. Gibe, 13 F.R.D. 16 (D. Del. 1952). "What constitutes good cause (under
Hickman v. Taylor] depends on the particular circumstances of each case and upon the
consideration of practical convenience." Id. at 1. "What constitutes good caus2 takes
into account considerations of practical convenience." Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d
615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 195S).
111. Colden v. R. 3. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
112. Ibid.
113. Uncle Ben's, Inc. v. Uncle Ben's Pancake Houses, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 905, 507 (S.D.
Tem. 1962).
114. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540, 542 (6th Cir. 1950).
115. Helverson v. 3. 3. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Alo. 1954).
116. Berger v. Central Vt. Ry., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Alass. 1943). The court said that
the depositions could be taken by mail.
117. Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 176 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1949).
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constituted "work product," since it is felt that both parties should have
access to a more or less contemporaneous account of the occurrence.118
However, it has been held that "good cause" has not been shown until the
movant has submitted affidavits to the effect that a "memory lapse" prevented
the witness from giving an accurate account in a deposition.'1 0 Also, where
the original depositions had been taken in a disorganized manner, production
was not ordered since the court felt that a showing of "good cause" was not
possible due to the manner in which the desired information had been
acquired. 20
Generally, the question is to be decided by an exercise of judicial discretion
based on factual considerations. The burden of proving the need must, in all
cases, be met by the movant.' 2 ' The courts have been careful to note that a
stringent standard, commensurate with the significance of the policy against
unwarranted invasion of an attorney's files, is to be applied.
122
B. Waiver
The protection given to trial preparation under the "work product" doctrine
may also be lost by a waiver. In United States v. Swift & Co.,123 the fact that
the Government had already revealed the information in part, and discussed it
with the defendant precluded the assertion of a claim of privilege. In order to
operate as a waiver, however, the disclosure of trial preparations must be to
an adverse party. Merely disclosing information to parties sharing a common
interest, even though such parties may not be involved in the action will
not operate as a waiver.12 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in the Hickman case has established and recognized a policy
of protecting legal efforts directed towards litigation. However, due to the
nature and peculiar fact pattern of that case, the application of the policy has
been the subject of confused and conflicting holdings. This difficulty is increased
by the practical impossibility of effective appellate review of discovery orders, 125
and the resultant paucity of binding, definitive appellate clarification of the
point. Had the proposed amendment been adopted, most of the difficulties
118. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Julian, 10 F.R.D. 452 (D. Del. 1950).
119. Thomas v. Trawler Red Jacket, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 349 (D. Mass. 1954).
120. Heiselmoyer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 17 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
121. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Martin v. Capital
Transit Co., 170 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
122. Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Vilastor-
Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
123. 24 F.R.D. 280 (NJ). Il. 1959).
124. See note 122 supra. The fact of disclosure to a possible codefendant three years
prior to the commencement of the action did not operate as a waiver. Vilastor-Kent Theatre
Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
125. See note 49 supra.
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